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ABUSIVE DEBT COLLECTION: SHOULD
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION EXIST?
In an effort to protect consumers from unfair, coercive, and
deceptive practices1 in the collection of consumer debts, the New
York State Legislature enacted Article 29-H of the General Busi-
ness Law.' The statute, known as the Debt Collection Procedures
Act ("DCPA"), prohibits both a principal creditor and its agent
from engaging in nine specific debt collection practices3 with re-
I See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 753, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1973),
reprinted in [1973] N.Y. Laws 2354 (McKinney). Within Governor Rockefeller's memoran-
dum approving the Debt Collection Procedures Act, he stated: "The consumers of this State
rightfully expect fairness in their dealings with the debt collection industry... Enactment
of this bill will help to insure that such practices are eliminated and that the debt collection
industry maintains a profile of fairness in its dealing with consumers." Id.
2 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 600-603 (McKinney 1984).
2 See id. § 601. Section 601 of the Debt Collection Procedures Act ("DCPA") states:
No principal creditor, as defined by this article, or his agent shall:
1. Simulate in any manner a law enforcement officer, or a representative of any
governmental agency of the state of New York or any of its political subdivisions;
or
2. Knowingly collect, attempt to collect, or assert a right to any collection fee,
attorney's fee, court cost or expense unless such changes [sic] are justly due and
legally chargeable against the debtor; or
3. Disclose or threaten to disclose information affecting the debtor's reputation for
credit worthiness with knowledge or reason to know that the information is false;
or
4. Communicate or threaten to communicate the nature of a consumer claim to
the debtor's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against the debtor. The
provisions of this subdivision shall not prohibit a principal creditor from commu-
nicating with the debtor's employer to execute a wage assignment agreement if the
debtor has consented to such an agreement; or
5. Disclose or threaten to disclose information concerning the existence of a debt
known to be disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact; or
6. Communicate with the debtor or any member of his family or household with
such frequency or at such unusual hours or in such a manner as cal) reasonably be
expected to abuse or harass the debtor; or
7. Threaten any action which the principal creditor in the usual course of his busi-
ness does not in fact take; or
8. Claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to
know that the right does not exist; or
9. Use a communication which simulates in any manner legal or judicial process or
which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by a govern-
ment, governmental agency, or attorney at law when it is not.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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spect to consumer debts.4 In addition to the protection provided
under the DCPA, the consumer debtor is also afforded protection
under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").5
Another statute, Regulation 10 of the New York City Consumer
Protection Law parallels the FDCPA, but provides protection only
to New York City consumers.' Aside from statutory remedies, legal
relief also is available- to consumer debtors under various tradi-
tional tort theories, such as intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, invasion of privacy, and defamation.7
Since the DCPA originally was intended to promote fair and
ethical practices in the collection of consumer debts,8 a question
In addition to section 601 of the New York General Business Law, the New York City
Department of Consumer Protection has adopted its own Debt Collection Practices Regula-
tion. See N.Y.C. Consumer Protection Law Regulation 10 (1979); see also infra note 6 (dis-
cussion of Regulation 10 of N.Y.C. Consumer Protection Law).
" See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 600 (McKinney 1984). Section 600, entitled "Definitions,"
states:
1. "Consumer claim" means any obligation of a natural person for the payment of
money or its equivalent which is or is alleged to be in default and which arises out
of a transaction wherein credit has been offered or extended to a natural person,
and the money, property or service which was the subject of the transaction was
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The term includes an obliga-
tion of a natural person who is a co-maker, endorser, guarantor or surety as well as
the natural person to whom such credit was originally extended.
2. "Debtor" means any natural person who owes or who is asserted to owe a con-
sumer claim.
3. "Principal creditor" means any person, firm, corporation or organization to
whom a consumer claim is owed, due or asserted to be due or owed, or any as-
signee for value of said person, firm, corporation or organization.
Id.
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988). The purpose of the federal Act as set forth in
section 1692(e) is "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses." Id. § 1692(e).
Although the purpose of both the federal and New York State Acts are similar, the
federal Act only applies to third-party debt collectors who regularly collect or attempt to
collect debts. See id. § 1692a(6). Additionally, the federal Act provides for civil liability, see
infra note 20 and accompanying text, whereas the New York Act does not, see infra note 28
and accompanying text.
6 See N.Y.C. Consumer Protection Law Regulation 10 (1979). In general, the substan-
tive provisions of Regulation 10 parallel the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988). The New York City regulation, however, cov-
ers abusive debt collection practices by creditors and their agents, while the FDCPA is lim-
ited in application to third-party creditors. See supra note 5.
1 See R. HoBBs, DEBT COLLECTION HARASSMENT 89-96 (Supp. 1986); S. SHERMAN, WHAT
To Do WHEN YOUR BILLS EXCEED YOUR PAYCHECK 107-09 (1974).
8 See Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on Consumer Protection, reprinted
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arose as to whether debt collection violations gives rise to an im-
plied private cause of action.9 Although the courts have addressed
the question, it remains uncertain whether a debt collection viola-
tion is a legal wrong redressable in a private civil action, or is en-
forceable civilly only by the attorney general or criminally by a dis-
trict attorney.10 States with similar debt collection statutes either
in [1973] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 52 (discussing abusive practices which prompted enactment of
DCPA).
" See, e.g., I.F.C. Personal Money Managers, Inc. v. Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d 841, 844, 508
N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986) (violation of General Business Law § 602
gives rise to private cause of action by debtor); Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 112 Misc.
2d 480, 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1982) (although not authorized
by statute, case law supports existence of private lawsuit), modified on other grounds, 93
A.D.2d 205, 462 N.Y.S.2d 297 (3d Dep't 1983); Lane v. Marine Midland Bank, 112 Misc. 2d
200, 202, 446 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982) (legislature did not intend
private remedies under Act); see also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 600 commentary at 545 (Mc-
Kinney 1984) ("Although private suits are not expressly authorized where actual damages
are shown to be caused by a statutory violation, there is case law to support liability"). New
York courts have recognized private lawsuits arising from violations of statutes which do not
explicitly provide such causes of action. See, e.g., Johnson v. Clay Partition Co., 93 Misc. 2d
414, 414, 402 N.Y.S.2d 912, 913 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (recognizing general rule that
"private right of action is implied from statutes which on their face provide penal sanc-
tions"), afl'd, 65 A.D.2d 737, 411 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1978); Barnes v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 69 Misc. 2d 1068, 1071, 332 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (violation of
Securities Act gave rise to implied private cause of action for damages), modified, 42 A.D.2d
15, 344 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1973); Ben Constr. Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 881,
254 N.Y.S.2d 948, 951-52 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1964) (where personal property stat-
ute did not provide absolute right of buyer to cancel contract, court recognized implied
right), afl'd, 24 A.D.2d 842, 264 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 1965). But see McWilliams v. Cath-
olic Diocese of Rochester, 145 A.D.2d 904, 904-05, 536 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (4th Dep't 1988)
(no private cause of action for violation of Mental Hygiene Law); Mauersberg v. E.F. Hut-
ton & Co., 116 A.D.2d 417, 421, 501 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (3d Dep't 1986) (no private cause of
action for violation of Securities Act provision).
The implication of a private right of action is not exclusive to the state courts, as evi-
- denced by the United States Supreme Court, which has recognized its judicial power to
imply a private right of action where the invoked statute does not explicitly provide for one.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (analysis of language of Voting
Rights Act in light of intended purpose allowed Court to find implied right for private per-
son to seek declaratory judgment against state for failure to comply with Act).
10 Compare Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 200-01, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (accepted procedure for
violation of Debt Collection Act is to file complaint with any agency that deals with con-
sumer problems) with Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d at 844, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (violation of Debt
Collection Act gives rise to private lawsuit) and Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 483, 447 N.Y.S.2d
at 217 (best method to compel debt collection agencies to comply with Act is to subject
them to private suits).
Several commentators have advocated the necessity of private enforcement in order to
remedy the evil which the legislatures address in enacting these debt collection guidelines.
See, e.g., Homburger, Harassment of Borrowers by Licensed Lenders, 1 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 39, 49 (1965) (civil remedies are better solution than criminal sanctions and informal
administrative processes to stop harassment in debt collection); Kripke, Gesture and Real-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:587
have expressly provided for a private cause of action within their
statute1 or have judicially implied a private action based on legis-
lative intent. 2 Texas, for example, in addition to enacting a debt
collection statute, has established an independent tort to protect
consumers from unreasonable collection attempts. 3
In view of recent case law, it is clear that the debt collection
rules in New York have been a source of intense unsettlement in
the area of implied civil liability. 4 Part One of this Note will ex-
amine the statutory requirements and remedies available to an ag-
grieved debtor in 'New York under the federal government's
FDCPA and New York's DCPA. Part Two will survey the leading
New York cases which have considered whether a private cause of
ity in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 46-49 (1969) (absence of vigorous
public enforcement coupled with budget difficulties leaves need for private enforcement of
consumer protection laws); Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039, 1040-41 (1968) (private enforce-
ment would still be useful).
'1 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (1986); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6850-
6956 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1788-1788.32 (West 1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 12-105 (1974 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-110a to -ll0q
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201-.213, 559.55-.78 (West 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 443A-1
to -17 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101-.7103 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:3510-:3571 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 1-107 to 7-
127 (1980); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501, 14-201 to -204 (1983 & Supp. 1990);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 49 (West 1984); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.251-.258
(West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-C:1 to -C:4 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-49.24 to
-.50, 75-50 to -56 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.99 (Baldwin 1988); Tax. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to -.11 (Vernon 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2462
(1984 & Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.16.100-.950 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
427.101-.105 (West 1980).
12 See, e.g., Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 397, 653 S.W.2d
128, 135 (1983) (statute designed to protect public implies right of enforcement by civil
action); Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857, 859 (Del. 1975) (statute whose primary purpose is to
protect consumers should be liberally construed to allow implied private right to sue); Rice
v. Snarlin, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 434, 441-42, 266 N.E.2d 183, 188-89 (1970) (private right of
action existed for violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, even though Act did not ex-
pressly provide for such remedy); Hockley v. Hargitt, 82 Wash. 2d 337, 350, 510 P.2d 1123,
1133 (1973) (implied right for consumer to sue furthers public interests).
13 See Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 20, 273 S.W.2d 64, 66 (1954). In Duty, the
Texas Supreme Court established the tort of unreasonable collection efforts. Id. The court
held that a cause of action exists when a creditor engages in harassing collection efforts that
result in mental anguish and physical injury. Id. Subsequently, Texas courts expanded this
tort by imposing liability on debtors whose tactics were implemented with reckless disregard
for a debtor's health or welfare. See Western Guar. Loan Co. v. Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857, 860
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957). The Texas courts have further expanded the tort to allow an action
to lie in negligent conduct which results in physical illness and mental or emotional pain.
See Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
" See supra note 10 (comparison of divergent views taken by New York lower courts).
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action exists for a debtor under the DCPA. Finally, Part Three will
analyze the viability of enforcing a private cause of action by ap-
plying the most recent statutory interpretation test provided by
the New York Court of Appeals, and conclude that amendments to
the General Business Law and recent judicial precedent provide a
framework within which one may recognize an implied private
cause of action under the New York DCPA.
I. REQUIREMENTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
AND STATE ACTS
In recognition that abuses in debt collection were both a wide-
spread and severe national problem,15 Congress enacted the
FDCPA, the first comprehensive debt collection statute.16 To effec-
tuate its purpose, the federal Act broadly proscribes harassing and
abusive debt collection practices, false or misleading representa-
tions, and unfair practices.1 7 In addition, the Act provides for en-
15 See S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1695, 1695. The Senate Report stated that "[h]earings before the Consumer
Affairs Subcommittee revealed that independent debt collectors are the prime source of
egregious collection practices." Id. at 1696. The report also revealed that the "primary rea-
son why debt collection abuse is so widespread is the lack of meaningful legislation on the
State level [and] [w]hile debt collection agencies have existed for decades, there are 13
States, with 40 million citizens, that have no debt collection laws." Id. at 1696-97; see H.R.
REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (major incentive for enactment of federal Act
was paucity of available remedies for egregious practices).
'a 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988). In relevant part, section 1692 sets forth the reasons
why there is a need for a federal law protecting consumers in all 50 states:
(a) Abusive practices
There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt
collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices con-
tribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss
of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.
(b) Inadequacy of Laws
Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to
protect consumers.
(c) Available non-abusive collection methods
Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices
are available for the effective collection of debts.
(e) Purposes
It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection prac-
tices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to pro-
mote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
Id. § 1692.
' Id. §§ 1692d - 1692e. Section 1692d provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] debt collec-
1990]
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forcement by an aggrieved individual, 8 the Federal Trade Com-
mission, or the administrative agency responsible for selected
industries as defined in the Act."" Under the FDCPA, consumers
who have been subjected to collection abuses have a right to bring
their own private action and may recover, in addition to actual
damages, court costs and attorneys' fees.20 Moreover, the federal
Act provides that a court may award additional statutory damages
of up to $1,000 for each individual subjected to abusive collection
practices.2 1 Although the Act proscribes a broad category of collec-
tion activities, its application is restricted to independent debt col-
tor may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or
abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." Id. § 1692d. Section 1692e
provides that "[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representa-
tion or means in connection with the collection of any debt." Id. § 1692e.
Although both the legislative history and the statute itself set forth the type of actions
to be prohibited by the federal Act, judicial opinions differ as to the standard to be applied
when determining whether conduct is false, deceptive, or misleading. Compare Bingham v.
Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (D.N.D. 1981) (district court applied sub-
jective capacity of debtor test) with Blackwell v. Professional Business Servs., Inc., 526 F.
Supp. 535, 537-38 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (court applied objective reasonable consumer standard).
The court in Blackwell specifically refused to adopt the "novel" standard used by the court
in the Bingham case. See id.
Section 1692f of the federal Act sets forth the general rule that "[a] debt collector may
not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt" and sup-
plements this by categorically listing eight areas of specific conduct considered to be unfair.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (1988). Although the federal Act sets forth a list of unfair practices,
interpreting the term "unfair" in its general sense has not been an easy task for the courts.
See Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts and Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 70 GEo. L.J. 225, 239-45 (1981) (discussing evolution of term
"unfair").
"S 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1988). Section 1692k provides in pertinent part: "Except as other-
wise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of
this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to
the sum of-(1) any actual damage sustained . . . as a result of such failure." Id. §
1692k(a)(1); see S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NFws 1695, 1699 ("committee views this legislation as primarily self enforcing;
consumers who have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance"). The
scope of the Act is not limited to the obligated consumer, but any individual who has been
harmed under the Act has standing to assert a cause of action. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau,
Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985) (individuals have right to be treated with respect);
Whatley v. Universal Collection Bureau, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1204, 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ag-
grieved parents of debtor have standing to sue).
-- 15 U.S.C. § 16921 (1988). Section 16921 provides: "Compliance with this subchapter
shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extent that enforcement of the require-
ments imposed under this subchapter is specifically committed to another agency under
subsection (b) of this section." Id.
20 Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
" Id. §1692k(a)(2).
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lectors who collect consumer debt.2" Thus, one who merely extends
credit and collects payment incident to credit transaction is not
subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. As a result of this exclu-
sion, most debt collection activities are excepted from the federal
Act.23
In contrast with the federal Act, the New York DCPA is broad
in scope since it regulates the conduct of all debt collectors seeking
to collect consumer debts.2 4 The DCPA classifies debt collectors as
"principal creditors, ' 2 defining such term to include "any person,
firm, corporation or organization [or assignee] to whom a consumer
claim is owed."' 26 Although the DCPA's classification of prohibited
practices is much less detailed than the federal Act, it is similar in
its prohibition against harassing, unfair, or deceptive collection
procedures. The major limitation of the DCPA is that it does not
specifically provide for a private cause of action; instead, it states
that a violation is a misdemeanor 28 which may be prosecuted by
the attorney general or a district attorney.2 However, while a pri-
vate cause of action has not been explicitly provided for, it is as-
serted that one may exist. The remainder of this Note will discuss
whether this private right of action exists along established statu-
22 Id. § 1692a. The term "debt collector" is defined, in relevant part, as follows:
"[D]ebt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the col-
lection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.
Id. § 1692a(6); see S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1695, 1697-98 (Congress intentionally omitted principal creditors
from federal Act). Congress concluded that unlike debt collection agencies, principal credi-
tors will be restrained from engaging in abusive debt collection practices by their business
desire to protect their goodwill and thus excluded them from the Act. Id. at 1696. In addi-
tion, Congress determined that because creditors usually are larger and more stable than
debt collection agencies, a Federal Trade Commission action against one creditor could be
expected to have an industry-wide deterrent effect, thereby making their inclusion in the
federal Act unnecessary. Id.
23 See S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1695, 1697-98 (listing debt collection activities included in Senate Report
accompanying bill, but excluded from final version of Act).
24 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. §§ 600(3), 601 (McKinney 1984).
25 Id. § 600(3).
20 Id.
27 Compare id. § 601 with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c-1692f (1988); see supra notes 5 & 6 (fur-
ther comparison of relevant New York and federal debt collection statutes).
28 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 602(1) (McKinney 1984).
21 Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1988). The federal Act specifically provides for
a private cause of action. Id.
1990]
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tory interpretation guidelines.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO IMPLIED PRIVATE REMEDIES
Although the New York DCPA does not expressly authorize a
private cause of action, individuals nonetheless have attempted to
privately enforce the statute against creditors or collection agencies
alleged to have engaged in prohibited methods of debt collection.3 0
The first case to consider whether a private right of action exists
under the New York statute was Lane v. Marine Midland Bank.3 1
In Lane, the New York Supreme Court, Erie County, recognized
that an implied civil remedy may be available under the DCPA.32
The Lane court determined that if the legislative intent sanctioned
private enforcement, then implication of a private right of action
could be proper.3 The court dismissed the suit, however, holding
that "[a]lthough it is the consumer who ultimately is meant to
benefit from the act, there are several indications that th accepted
procedure is a complaint to any agency which deals with consumer
problems. 3 4 Through the application of the guidelines pronounced
by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash3" determining
1o See I.F.C. Personal Money Managers, Inc. v. Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d 841, 843, 508
N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986) (individual brought suit against creditor
who violated General Business Law § 601); Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 112 Misc. 2d
480, 481, 447 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1982), modified on other grounds,
93 A.D.2d 205, 462 N.Y.S.2d 297 (3d Dep't 1983) (private damages suit existed to recover
for injuries resulting from violation of statute); Lane v. Marine Midland Bank, 112 Misc. 2d
200, 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982) ("civil relief on the basis of the
act is not barred by its failure to expressly provide for such relief").
31 112 Misc. 2d at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982).
32 Id. at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874. See generally McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implica-
tion of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. Rav. 167
(1976) (tracing American doctrine of implied causes of action, including examination of Bur-
ger Court's approach); Note, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judi-
cial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1972)
(suggesting that doctrine of implication is effective means of judicial implication of private
remedies).
3 Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
'4 Id.; see Memorandum of the Joint Legislative Committee on Consumer Protection,
reprinted in [1973] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 52. ("attorney general or any district attorney is em-
powered to prevent an abusive tactic from being continued and persons who violate the
provision of this article are guilty of a misdemeanor").
-- 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court set forth four factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a private right of action may be implied in a statute: (1)
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose 'especial' benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to grant such a right; (3)
whether the implication of a private civil remedy would be consistent with the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is not one which traditionally has been rele-
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whether a private right of action may be implied in a statute, the
Lane court concluded that the present legislative scheme does not
allow a private action for violation of the DCPA 6
In contrast to the Lane decision, a more policy-oriented analy-
sis of the possible existence of an implied private cause of action
was advanced in KohIer v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 7 In Kohler, the
defendant debt collector had visited the plaintiff's place of employ-
ment and communicated the nature of the plaintiff's debt to his
employer.38 The New York Supreme Court, Albany County, held
that a private suit could be brought under the DCPA.3 9 Finding
that the defendant had, in fact, violated the statute,0 the court
gated to state law. Id. at 78.
After applying the four-prong Cort test, the Lane court examined articles 29-I, 30, and
33 of the New York General Business Law, which all deal with consumer protection. Lane,
112 Misc. 2d at 201-02, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874-75. Article 29-I, entitled "The Storage of
Household Goods," better known as the "truth in storage act," was enacted to protect con-
sumers who place household goods in storage with a warehouseman. See N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw §§ 605-610 (McKinney 1984). Section 609 of the Act provides that "[a]ny consumer
bailor damaged by an unlawful detention of his goods... may bring an action for recovery
of damages .... ." Id. § 609. Article 30 entitled "Health Club Services" was designed to
protect consumers from deceptive business practices of health clubs. See id. §§ 620-631.
Section 628 provides that "[a]ny buyer damaged by a violation of this article may bring an
action for recovery of damages." Id. § 628. Finally, article 33, the Franchise Act, provides for
civil remedies under Section 691 of the General Business Law. See id. §§ 680-695.
11 Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 202, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 875. Plaintiff also alleged a violation of
the FDCPA and asserted a cause of action based on the common-law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 202-03, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. The Lane court dis-
missed the cause of action based on the Act because the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant fit within the federal statute's definition of "debt collector." Id. However, the
court found that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 203, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
37 112 Misc. 2d 480, 447 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1982), modified on
other grounds, 93 A.D.2d 205, 462 N.Y.S.2d 297 (3d Dep't 1983).
-8 Id. at 480-81, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 216. According to the plaintiff, an agent for the de-
fendant came to the plaintiff's place of business and informed the plaintiff's employer that
the plaintiff would have to quit his job since the defendant was repossessing the plaintiff's
automobile. Id. An argument then arose between the plaintiff and the agent for the defen-
dant. Id. at 481, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The defendant went forward with the repossession of
the car and later sold it at auction for a price well below its book value. Id.
" Id. at 483, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The interpretative analysis focusing on the question
of whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute
is generally recognized as the doctrine of implication, first established by the United States
Supreme Court in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, the Court
stated that "disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default is implied." Id. at 39.
40 Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 601(4)
(McKinney 1984) (principal creditor not permitted to "[clommunicate or threaten to com-
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stated that "[a] person injured by the violation of a statutory duty
is permitted to maintain an action for that violation if he is within
the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute. 41 The
court further determined that an implied private right of action
against debt collectors who engage in prohibited collection proce-
dures was consistent with the DCPA's purpose "to protect debtors
from debt collection practices that the Legislature considered rep-
rehensible. ' 42 In addition, the Kohler court observed that "there
have been prior private lawsuits to recover against debt collectors
for collection practices. '43
Since the Kohler decision, only one case has addressed the ex-
istence of an implied private right of action under New York's
DCPA. In LF.C. Personal Money Managers, Inc. v. Vadney,44 the
New York Supreme Court, Albany County, in accordance with the
holding of Kohler, recognized a private right of action for violation
of the New York DCPA.45 In Vadney, a creditor threatened the
defendant with a suit for attorneys' fees if she did not immediately
pay her debt.48 The Vadney court recognized that such action was
municate the nature of a consumer claim to the debtor's employer prior to obtaining final
judgment against the debtor").
4 Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see Pauley v. Steam Gauge &
Lantern Co., 131 N.Y. 90, 95, 29 N.E. 999, 1000 (1892). In Pauley, a widow brought a wrong-
ful death action against the defendant for violation of a New York statute requiring the
construction of fire escapes upon the outside of all factories three stories high or taller. Id.
The court stated that "[t]he requirement of fire escapes was for the... special benefit of the
operatives... and the rule applies that when a statute... prohibits a thing for the benefit
of a person he shall have a remedy upon the same statute... for a wrong done to him." Id.
at 95-96, 29 N.E. at 1000.
42 Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The Kohler court stated that
"[w]hile section 602 of the General Business Law authorizes the district attorney or attorney
general to bring an action to compel compliance, that section does not specifically prohibit
private suits for compensatory damages." Id. at 482-83, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The court
further reasoned that it could not think of a better way to force debt collection agenciis to
act in compliance with the law than to permit private suits against them. See id. at 483, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 217.
" Id. at 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217; see McKimmie v. AVCO Fin. Servs. Co., 504 F.
Supp. 1286, 1288-89 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (debtor commenced personal action against creditor
for violation of New York's DCPA).
1, 133 Misc. 2d 841, 508 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986).
45 Id. at 844, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
" Id. at 843, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 846. In Vadney, the defendant debtor, Vadney, had re-
tained the plaintiff corporation to prepare her income tax returns. Id. at 842, 508 N.Y.S.2d
at 846. At that time, the plaintiff corporation gave Vadney an estimate of $175 to $250 to
complete the returns. Id. Vadney alleged that it took the plaintiff six months to complete
her tax returns, and that they were prepared in an unprofessional manner. Id. The plaintiff
corporation sent a bill to Vadney totaling $500 for preparation of her tax returns. Id. at 842-
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a direct violation of section 601(2) of the DCPA, and as such,
"gives rise to a private lawsuit for damages sustained by the
debtor.4
71
Although the courts in both Lane and Kohler applied their
own tests to determine whether a private right of action exists
under the DCPA,48 such tests were superseded to some degree by
the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Burns Jackson Miller
Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner.9 In Burns Jackson, a New York
City law firm filed a class action suit to recover damages resulting
from the transit strike of April, 1980.50 The law firm alleged that
the strike violated section 210 of the Civil Service Law and sought
to enforce the statute privately.5' The court, confronted with the
question of whether a private right of action exists under the Tay-
lor Act,52 set forth three factors to determine whether an implied
private right of action exists in a penal statute: (1) whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose particular benefit the
statute was enacted; (2) whether the statute or legislative history
indicates that the legislature intended to create a private right of
action under the statute; and (3) whether the creation of a private
43, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 846. After Vadney forwarded $150 in full payment for services, the
corporation sent Vadney a letter stating that if it did not receive $380 within 15 days, it
would be forced to instruct its attorney to commence an action against Vadney for the en-
tire balance due, in addition to court costs, attorney's fees, and interest. Id. at 843, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 846.
"I Id. at 844, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847. Section 601(2) provides that no principal creditor
shall "[k]nowingly collect, attempt to collect, or assert a right to any collection fee, attor-
ney's-fee, court cost or expense unless such changes [sic] are justly due and legally chargea-
ble against the debtor." See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 601(2) (McKinney 1984). The Vadney
court stated that "[a] creditor has no right to have his attorney's fee paid by the debtor
unless a statute or a contract between the debtor and creditor specifically so provides."
Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d at 843, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (citing Citibank v. Galor Constr. Co., 60
A.D.2d 667, 667, 400 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208-09 (3d Dep't 1977)). By threatening the defendant
debtor with a right to attorney's fees, which the plaintiff was unable to establish, the plain-
tiff violated the statute. Id. at 844, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
-8 Compare Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (court followed guidelines
pronounced by United States Supreme Court in Cort) with Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 480, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 215-18 (court disregarded Supreme Court's statutory interpretation approach in
Cort and followed policy-orientated approach). For a general discussion of these two ap-
proaches, see Note, supra note 35.
59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
'o See id. at 322-23, 451 N.E.2d at 461, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
5 Id. at 323, 451 N.E.2d at 462, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 715. The law firm sought damages of
"$50,000,000 per day for each day of the strike." Id.
52 See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). This statute,
known as the Taylor Act, prohibits strikes of public employees or employee organizations.
See id. § 210.
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right of action is consistent with the purpose underlying the legis-
lative scheme.53 The court's three-part inquiry resulted in the con-
clusion that the legislature did not intend to create a private right
of action under the Taylor Act.5 4
The New York Court of Appeals has, in subsequent cases, ap-
plied the Burns Jackson analysis before implying a private right of
action in a penal statute." In CPC International, Inc. v. McKesson
Corp., 6 the Court of Appeals held that the Martin Act 5 7 does not
contain an implied private cause of action for violation of its provi-
sions."' In applying the second part of the Burns Jackson test, the
53 Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at 325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716. In adopt-
ing the three-factor test, the court looked to prior United States Supreme Court cases. Id.;
see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-
18 (1981) (use statutory language, legislative history, and other traditional statutory inter-
pretation aids to determine whether Congress intended private right of action); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-40 (1976) (applying same three part test adopted in Burns
Jackson); Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (applied factors adopted in Burns Jackson).
' Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718 ("provi-
sions of the present statute and the history of their enactment strongly suggest that a pri-
vate action based upon the statute was not intended"). Although the Burns Jackson court
found that the plaintiff was within the class of individuals intended to benefit from the
statute, a private right of action was denied because "[a] private action, which would impose
per se liability without any of the limitations applicable to the common-law forms of action
... would inevitably upset the delicate balance established after 20 years of legislative
pondering." Id. at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
55 See, e.g., Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629, 633-34, 541
N.E.2d 18, 20, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (1989) (regarding whether private cause of action
exists under Penal Law § 260.20(4), Burns Jackson test of "central importance"); CPC Int'l,
Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 276-77, 514 N.E.2d 116, 118-19, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804,
807 (1987) (citing Burns Jackson and applying test in determining that private cause of
action does not, exist under Martin Act); see also Board of Managers v. Fairways, 150
A.D.2d 32, 36, 545 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345-46 (2d Dep't 1989) (intermediate appellate court ap-
plying Burns Jackson analysis).
:6 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987).
7 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c (McKinney 1984). The Martin Act makes it illegal
for any person, partnership, corporation, or agent thereof to engage in deceptive practices to
promote the sale of any security. The Act prohibits, in pertinent part:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or
pretended purchase or sale;
(b) Any promise or representation as to the future which is beyond reasonable
expectation or unwarranted by existing circumstances;
(c) Any representation or statement which is false, where the person who made
such representation or statement: (i) knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort
could have known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the
truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge concerning the representation or statement
made; ... to induce or promote the ... sale ... of any securities....
Id. For a general discussion of the Martin Act, see Survey, GBL § 352-c: No Private Cause
of Action under New York's "Blue Sky" Law, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 210 (1986).
58 CPC Int'l, 70 N.Y.2d at 276-77, 514 N.E.2d at 119, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The majority
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court stated that "the specific purpose of the statute was to create
a statutory mechanism in which the Attorney-General would have
broad regulatory and remedial powers," 59 and thus, an implied pri-
vate action would not be consistent with the legislative scheme."
More recently, the Court of Appeals applied its Burns Jackson
analysis in Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Days, Inc.6 1 In
Sheehy, the court considered whether section 260.20(4) of the Pe-
nal Law"2 gives rise to an implied private right of action in favor of
a person who has been injured as a result of his or her consump-
tion of alcohol.63 The Sheehy court refused to recognize a private
cause of action because such recognition would not be consistent
with the legislative scheme.6
held that "the particular purpose of section 352-c [the Martin Act] is the creation of an
enforcement mechanism within which a private action is not implied." Id. at 277, 514
N.E.2d at 119, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 807. Judges Hancock and Simons had a different view, argu-
ing that the implied private action would be in conformity with the broad statutory purpose
and therefore would be in compliance with the Burns Jackson requirements. Id. (Hancock,
Jr. & Simons, JJ., dissenting in part) (dissenting opinion included within text of majority
opinion authored by Judge Hancock).
60 Id.
0 Id.
73 N.Y.2d 629, 541 N.E.2d 18, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1989).
62 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20(4) (McKinney 1989). The statute, in relevant part,
states:
A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with a child when:...
He gives or sells or causes to be given or sold any alcoholic beverage, as de-
fined by section three of the alcoholic beverage control law, to a person less than
twenty-one years old; except that this subdivision does not apply to the parent or
guardian of such a person ....
Id.
63 Sheehy, 73 N.Y.2d at 631, 541 N.E.2d at 19, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 19. In Sheehy, the
plaintiff Margaret Sheehy, a minor, attended an outdoor community function and was
served several glasses of beer. Id. at 632, 541 N.E.2d at 19, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 19. After being
served the alcohol, she travelled across a highway and entered a bar where she was served
another alcoholic beverage. Id. The plaintiff then attempted to cross the highway and return
to the community function when she was struck by an automobile and severely injured. Id.
Sheehy brought suit against those who served her beer at the community function and the
operator of the bar, claiming that serving her alcohol was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Id.
6 Id. at 635-36, 541 N.E.2d at 22, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The Sheehy court found that the
plaintiff had satisfied the first two prongs of the three-prong Burns Jackson test. Id. at 634,
541 N.E.2d at 20, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 20. Under the first prong, the Sheehy court stated that
"[t]he statutory provision crininalizing the provision of alcoholic beverages to those under
the legal purchase age ... was unquestionably intended.., to protect such [children and
incompetents] from the health and safety dangers of alcohol consumption." Id. at 634, 541
N.E.2d at 21, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
Under the second prong of the Burns Jackson test, the Sheehy court stated that
"[s]imilarly, it cannot be denied that recognition of a private right of action for civil dam-
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It is clear that the Burns Jackson test is the applicable stan-
dard to determine whether an implied private cause of action by a
debtor should be recognized under the DCPA. It is submitted that
application of the Burns Jackson test to the DCPA will result in
the conclusion that a private cause of action exists on behalf of the
aggrieved consumer. Moreover, alterations made to other portions
of the New York Consumer Protection statute tend to support this
position by illustrating that it was the legislature's intention to
permit an implied private cause of action under the DCPA.
III. THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION RECOGNIZED
Private civil relief for violation of the DCPA by collectors of
debt and their agents would supplement the already existing en-
forcement and disciplinary powers of the attorney general and dis-
trict attorneys.6 5 Even though civil liability was not expressly pro-
vided by the New York Legislature,6 courts generally have held
that it is the intention of the legislature and not simply a literal
reading of the words of the statute that constitutes the law. 7
Thus, a literal meaning of the statutory language must not be ad-
hered to if it defeats the general purpose policy intended to be pro-
moted.' Accordingly, it is a court's duty to ascertain and declare
ages would, as a general matter, advance the legislative purpose." Id. It was the third prong
of the Burns Jackson test that the court could not satisfy in order to recognize the private
action. Id. The court found that the legislature had "deliberately adopted a scheme for af-
fording civil damages to those injured." Id. at 635, 541 N.E.2d at 21, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
The court further recognized that the scheme does not permit recovery to the individual
who became inebriated from the illegal sale. Id.; see Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d
338, 341, 227 N.E.2d 21, 24, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116 (1967); Reuter v. Flobo Enter., 120
A.D.2d 722, 723-24, 503 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (2d Dep't 1986); Allen v. County of Westchester,
109 A.D.2d 475, 479, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 915,
489 N.E.2d 773, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1985).
65 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 602 (McKinney 1984). Section 602 authorizes the attorney
general or the district attorney of any county to bring an action against a debt collector to
restrain or prevent any violation of the statute. Id. Many legal professionals believe that a
private cause of action is necessary to enforce this type of consumer statute. See Kripke,
supra note 10, at 46-51; Spanogle, supra note 10, at 1039-44; Note, supra note 32, at 413-19.
" See Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874. There was no mention in either
the "Governor's Memorandum, the Memorandum of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Consumer Protection, nor any item in the Bill Jacket accompanying the act [which] gives
any express pronouncement of whether or not private actions under the act are foreclosed."
Id.
6 See City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 253 N.Y. 49, 56, 170 N.E.
489, 491 (1930); Schieffelin v. Lahey, 243 N.Y. 102, 111, 152 N.E. 690, 692-93 (1926); Bork v.
City of Buffalo, 127 N.Y. 64, 69, 27 N.E. 355, 356 (1891).
88 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940);
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the intention of the legislature69 even though the expression of its
intentions may be imperfect at times.70 It is suggested, therefore,
that a private civil cause of action can be validly asserted under a
proper application of the Burns Jackson test.
The first part of the Burns Jackson test questions whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose particular benefit the
statute was enacted.7 1 As in Burns Jackson, the analysis begins
with the statute itself."2 The DCPA defines the class of debtors to
be protected as "any natural person who owes or who is asserted to
owe a consumer claim. 73 Although the language is rather broad, a
further examination of the history74 of the DCPA demonstrates
that all consumer debtors are within the protected class. 75
The second part of the Burns Jackson test requires an analy-
sis as to whether recognition of a private right of action would pro-
mote the legislative purpose of the statute. 6 In construing a stat-
ute to determine its legislative intent, it is well established that
courts may take into consideration numerous types of extrinsic
aids.77 The primary purpose of the DCPA, as exemplified by nu-
Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 221 N.E.2d 546, 549, 274 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (1966);
Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 32,- 38, 215 N.E.2d 329, 331, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5
(1966).
69 See Astman v. Kelly, 2 N.Y.2d 567, 572-73, 141 N.E.2d 899, 902, 161 N.Y.S.2d 860,
864-65 (1957); River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 43-44, 110
N.E.2d 545, 548-49 (1953); Holmes v. Carley, 31 N.Y. 289, 289 (1865).
10 See Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123, 127-28, 196 N.E. 766, 768 (1935); People ex
rel. Streckler v. Warden of City Prison, 259 N.Y. 430, 433, 182 N.E. 73, 74 (1932).
71 Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at 325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716; see Cort,
422 U.S. at 78 (first part of Cort test parallels first prong of Burns Jackson test).
72 Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at 325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
73 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 600(2) (McKinney 1984). For a definition of the term "con-
sumer claim," see supra note 4.
7' It is generally recognized that the terms of a statute are to be interpreted in light of
the statute's historical background. See In re Stupack, 274 N.Y. 198, 206, 8 N.E.2d 485, 490'
(1937); In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 414, 124 N.E. 4, 6, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
7 See supra note 1. The breadth of consumer coverage provided for by the DCPA is
reflected in the statute's legislative history. See Governor's Memorandum on Bills Ap-
proved, reprinted in [1973] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 314. "This measure will add a new and impor-
tant dimension to the rapidly expanding body of consumer law... The consumers of this
State rightfully expect fairness in their dealings with the debt collection industry." Id.
71 Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at-325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
7 See Lockport Union-Sun & Journal, Inc. v. Preisch, 8 N.Y.2d 54, 57-58, 167 N.E.2d
839, 840-41, 201 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507-08 (1960) (courts may look to reports of officers or agen-
cies charged with duty of enforcing Act); People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 472-74, 158 N.E.2d
699, 707, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26, 36-38 (1959) (court may look to memorandum by Governor);
Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 86-91, 133 N.E.2d 817, 826-29, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 597-
605 (1956) (courts may use legislative reports to ascertain motive and intent of legislature).
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merous portions of the Governor's Bill Jacket, was to remedy the
existing problem of unethical debt collection practices by prohibit-
ing specific types of collection practices.78 Courts79 and commenta-
tors80 uniformly agree that the legislative purpose of the DCPA
was to protect consumer debtors from unscrupulous debt collection
practices. By allowing a private action, the legislative purpose
would be promoted by assuring strict enforcement of the DCPA,
even in the absence of vigorous public enforcement."' In addition, a
private cause of action would present the court with more opportu-
nities to address questionable creditor conduct and aid in clearly
defining the statute's limitations.2
The final, and often most difficult part of the Burns Jackson
test, requires an analysis of whether the creation of a private cause
of action would be consistent with the legislative scheme. 3 The
legislative scheme can best be defined as the plan of action the
legislature implemented to enforce the provisions of a statute. New
York's DCPA specifically provides that "[t]he attorney general or
the district attorney of any county may bring an action in the
name of the people of the state to restrain or prevent any violation
of this [statute]."" Although the DCPA does not explicitly provide
for a private cause of action, other portions of the General Busi-
ness Law which overlap the legislative purpose of the DCPA do
provide for such actions.8 5 The most important of these alternative
78 See supra notes 1 & 75 and accompanying text.
79 See Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d at 843-44, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 847; Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at
482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217; Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at 201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874. Although these
principal cases have held differently on the question of whether a private right of action
exists under the DCPA, they are all in agreement that the legislative purpose of the Act was
to protect consumers from abuse by debt collectors. See Vadney, 133 Misc. 2d at 843-44,
508 N.Y.S.2d at 847; Kohler, 112 Misc. 2d at 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217; Lane, 112 Misc. 2d at
201, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
80 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 600, practice commentary at 544-45 (McKinney 1984).
"The practices leading to enactment of the... [DCPAI included pressure on debtors to pay
regardless of the merits of the claim." Id. at 544.
81 See Kripke, supra note 10, at 46. Since budget difficulties will always plague state
and local governments, it is best to grant a private civil action to assure enforcement of the
act. Id. For a general discussion of why consumers should have a private cause of action, see
Kripke, supra note 10, and Spanogle, supra, note 10.
82 See Spanogle, The U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIo ST.
L.J. 624, 627 (1968) (private enforcement will assure enforcement even where conduct by
creditors is questionable).
83 Burns Jackson, 59 N.Y.2d at 330-32, 451 N.E.2d at 466-67, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
84 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 602(2) (McKinney 1984).
85 See id. § 349 (McKinney 1988) (enacted to protect consumers from deceptive acts
and unlawful business practices); id. § 350-d (McKinney Supp. 1990) (enacted to prohibit
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consumer protection statutes is section 349 of the General Business
Law,86 commonly known as the Deceptive Business Practices Act
("DBPA"), which deals explicitly with deceptive business
practices.
It has long been recognized that similar statutes enacted for
the purpose of avoiding similar evils should be construed to-
gether8 7 and applied harmoniously and consistently.,8 The DBPA
states that "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any bus-
iness, trade or commerce, or in the furnishing of any service in this
state, are hereby declared unlawful."89 The essential link between
the two acts is that they both address deceptive business prac-
tices.90 The essential difference between the two acts is that the
DBPA was amended by the state legislature in 1980 to provide for
a private cause of action.91
Since the New York Legislature has created a new private
right of action under DBPA, it is essential to define judicially the
word "deceptive" in order to transmit the private cause of action
from the DBPA to the DCPA. The analysis begins with the legisla-
tive purpose of the DBPA. In State v. Colorado State Christian
College,9 2 the court stated that "the legislative purpose in enacting
false advertising); id. § 351 (McKinney 1988) (enacted to prohibit deceptive practices in
buying and selling of public securities).
0' Id. § 349(h) (McKinney 1988). Subsection (h) provides:
In addition to the right of action granted to the attorney general pursuant to this
section, any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of this section
may bring an action in his own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an
action to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both
such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to
an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dol-
lars, if the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
87 See Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 302 N.Y. 226, 231, 97 N.E.2d 877, 879
(1951); Hennessy v. Walker, 279 N.Y. 94, 99-102, 17 N.E.2d 782, 784-85 (1938).
88 See Public Serv. Comm'n v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 193 A.D. 615, 618, 185 N.Y.S. 267, 270-
71 (3d Dep't 1920).
81 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
90 Compare id. § 601 (McKinney 1984) (prohibits certain enumerated deceptive ac-
tions) with id. § 349 (McKinney 1988) (prohibits all forms of deceptive practices by any
business).
1 Id. § 349(h); see Governor's Memorandum on Approval of Amendments to § 349 and
§ 350 (June 19, 1980), reprinted in [1980] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 147-48. "In recognizing the need
for private enforcement, New York joins forty-two other states and the District of Columbia
that have granted individuals the right to sue for injuries resulting from consumer fraud."
Id.
92 76 Misc. 2d 50, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
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[the DBPA] . . .was to follow in the steps of the Federal Trade
Commission with respect to the interpretation of deceptive acts
and practices outlawed in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act."93 Since the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, a number of cases have supported the theory that unethical
collection practices are included under the definition of decep-
tive. 4 Recently, in Floersheim v. Federal Trade Commission," a
defendant mailed collection letters to delinquent debtors contain-
ing the repetition of the words "Washington, D.C." Concluding
that the defendant had "exploit[ed] the assumption of many...
debtors that [mail] emanating from Washington, D.C.,. . . [came]
from the government," '96 the court held that the defendant's ac-
tions were clearly deceptive to the debtor and thus in violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 7
In addition to the Federal Trade Commission Act, deceptive
collection practices also have been held violative of New York's
DBPA. In In re Scrimpsher,98 a debtor brought an action against
his creditor for sending him repeated notices of the existence of an
outstanding debt. The court held that the creditor's notices to the
debtor did in fact constitute a deceptive practice in violation of the
DBPA and therefore allowed the debtor to maintain a private right
of action. 9 It is submitted, therefore, following this line of case
law, that the legislative scheme in New York in amending section
349 of the General Business Law, will allow consumer debtors to
maintain private causes of action for deceptive collection practices.
CONCLUSION
In view of recent decisions from the New York Court of Ap-
peals addressing the issue of an implied statutory private right of
action, it is apparent that a debtor's private claim will be deemed
recognizable only where the judiciary can find a clear legislative
intent to create an implied private right. The legislative history of
:3 Id. at 54, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
' See Floersheim v. F.T.C., 411 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1002 (1970); Bennett v. F.T.C., 200 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Dejay Stores, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 200 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1952); Silverman v. F.T.C., 145 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir.
1944).
411 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970).
9' Id. at 877.
11 Id. at 878.
17 Bankr. 999 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 1016-17.
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the Debt Collection Procedures Act and the recognition of a pri-
vate right of action under section 349 of the General Business Law
reveal an intent on the part of the legislature to create a private
right of action for a creditor's misconduct.
This Note has asserted that the correct statutory analysis is
the three-step standard enunciated in Burns Jackson Miller Sum-
mit & Spitzer v. Lindner. Under the Burns Jackson test, it is clear
that deceptive practices by debt collectors will give rise to a pri-
vate civil action. In addition, traditional collection acts categorized
as unfair practices also must give rise to an implied cause of action
so that the Debt Collection Procedures Act's objective of protect-
ing consumer debtors from harassment, may be achieved to the
fullest extent possible. Thus, recognition of a private right of ac-
tion under the Debt Collection Procedure Act should greatly assist
consumers in halting, deterring, and redressing violations of the
statute.
Richard A. Nessler
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